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INTRODUCTION: RENAISSANCE
POSTHUMANISM AND ITS AFTERLIVES
Steven Swarbrick and Karen Raber

But all that talk about the post-human, the nonhuman, the inhuman and the problem of lumping all
humans into the Anthropocene provides a way of sustaining the human as a problem. What if the human
were an effect of its own delusions of self-erasure?
—Tom Cohen and Claire Colebrook,
Twilight of the Anthropocene Idols1
Renaissance literature contains many afterlives. Shakespeare’s Hamlet,
for example, ends with the Prince of Denmark’s impossibly pseudoposthumous “Horatio, I am dead,” whereas the play’s ghostly beginning, “Who’s there?,” blurs the distinction between this life and the
next (5.2.340, 1.1.1).2 The play’s gravedigger asks about Christian burial,
whereas Hamlet himself considers a thoroughly materialist afterlife, in
which the body is recycled among the Earth’s various elements. As this
brief example suggests, the concept of Renaissance afterlives raises a series
of important questions about time and agency: When does the “after” of
an afterlife begin, and where does the agency for transmission to a future
moment reside? The question of the afterlife as a religious proposition
in early modern thought and writing is, of course, ubiquitous. But the
ethics and politics of life on Earth do not arise only out of religious doctrine. From Giordano Bruno to Margaret Cavendish, monist and vitalist
theories shaped debates on the proper relationship between human and
nonhuman life; these theories resonate for many current scholars with
the turn to the “posthuman” in our own literary-philosophical moment.3
For scholars working in the environmental humanities, the turn to the
posthuman signifies in various ways the “afterlife” of the human, itself a
response to the destabilizing pressures of climate change, toxic ecologies,
biotechnology, and species extinction on many levels. In an era in which
the distinction between human and posthuman has lost much of its force,
environmental scholars have begun to theorize the afterlife of the human
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as “intra-active” (Barad), “compositional” (Latour), “companionate”
(Haraway), “vibrant” and “affective” (Bennett), and “trans-corporeal”
(Alaimo).4 Still others have begun to question the very category of life,
suggesting that we have always already been “after life” (Thacker), “postlife” (Colebrook), or living/unliving, like a zombie or virus (Serres).5 Do
these entanglements suggest the death of the human, its survival in other
forms, or both? And what do we mean by death or survival? How do
terms like “sustainability,” “composting,” or “recycling” enable different
visions of the afterlife?
This special issue attempts to answer these questions by focusing our
attention on the afterlives of the Renaissance. We treat “afterlives” as
a contronym, a word so contradictory that it undoes its own future: on
the one hand, “afterlife” suggests a life after death, but it also signals the
end of life. Both senses of the word, afterlife and after life, or survival
and extinction, mingle inextricably in the literature of the Renaissance,
as we’ve seen already with Hamlet’s postmortem address. Although the
scholarship on Renaissance posthumanism has flourished in recent years,
this work tends to focus solely on the first definition of afterlives, emphasizing what is lively or animate in the early modern text. But as feminist,
queer, disability, and critical race scholars have pointed out, terms such
as “life” and “animacy” can also be violently exclusionary, since what is
deemed “alive” may very well encode the same racist, ableist, and colonial
ideologies that have historically shaped Western ideas of the human as
white, patriarchal, and masculine (we return to this point at the end of
our introduction).6 This special issue provides the occasion to meditate on
the second definition of afterlives. We are interested in lives gone askew
and in forms of un/living that disjoin the present, like Hamlet’s ghost.
In short, we theorize the posthuman as a problem, precisely a problem
of time and materiality, and one that puts pressure on the logic of pre
and post.7 The Renaissance afterlives gathered in this collection challenge
readers to dwell in the ecologically precarious, at times unlivable, spaces
shaped by inequalities directly impacting the Earth system. For this reason, they prove productive sites for analyzing the deep-seated vivophilia
that currently underwrites our posthuman moment.
From Renaissance Humans to Posthuman Ghosts
In recent years, scholars have shown that the Renaissance human was,
like the posthuman now, open to novel configurations with the lives of
“others”: from animals, plants, and minerals, to the racial and colonial
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subjects who were typically denied “human” distinction.8 Bruno Latour
suggests that it may just be that our own ecological and technological
moment increasingly mirrors that of the past: “I have the feeling,” Latour
writes, “that we are actually closer to the sixteenth century than to the
twentieth.”9 Citing the Renaissance “notion of a harmony between the
micro- and macrocosm,” as well as the belief “in a world animated by all
sorts of entities,” Latour suggests that we will once again have to learn
from the cosmologies of “pre-modernity” if we are to recompose a common world.10
Likewise, in their introduction to the edited collection Arts of Living
on a Damaged Planet, editors Anna Tsing et al., writing from the intersections of science and technology studies, anthropology, poststructuralism,
postcolonialism, feminist new materialisms, and anti-capitalist critique,
return to the cosmologies of the Renaissance, particularly the Great Chain
of Being theory, to imagine the micro- and macrocosmic imbrications of
all living things. As Tsing and her coauthors write:
In Europe, northern Renaissance thinkers came up with
a great scheme linking classical, religious, and emergent
modern thinking. They claimed that life had evolved from
simple to complex. This was a grand and optimistic view
that placed humans at the top of the Great Chain of Being,
the highest rung of a ladder, where God had once resided.
Like the Christian religious thought before it, the scheme
assumed that we were all in a single time, on a single
trajectory.11
For these authors, the Great Chain of Being is not only posthuman but
also postvital: posthuman in the sense that it gathers multiple assemblages
of matter, and postvital in the sense that living beings leave traces, even
after they are dead. We—humans and nonhumans—live on borrowed
time, Tsing et al. suggest: “After death comes the strange life of ghosts.”12 The
trick is to bring these ghostly traces out of the past and into our present
awareness.13
While this special issue does not support an uncritical return to premodern cosmologies, it shares Latour’s interest in shuttling between past
and present, and finds in Renaissance literary works a valuable window
onto the ecological politics of today. Renaissance afterlives, we argue, are
not only geared toward more life but also put under erasure the present
ubiquity of uncritical returns to “life” and “arts of living.” With Jacques
Derrida, who, in his final interview, insisted to the very end, “I remain
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uneducable when it comes to any kind of wisdom about knowing-how-todie or, if you prefer, knowing-how-to-live,” we propose that life itself is a
dangerous supplement.14 That is, life cannot be added to death, because “life
is living on, life is survival [la vie est survie].”15 In other words, Renaissance
afterlives pose the very problem of life’s dehiscence or self-fracture.
Without denying, then, the importance of arts of living, as naturephilosophers from Henri Bergson to James Lovelock to Tsing and her
coauthors advocate, we remain—together with the authors gathered in
this special issue—uneducable in the arts of learning to live. For it is not
just the case, as Roy Scranton suggests, that the main ethical task today is
“learning to die in the Anthropocene”16—this keeps the cleavage between
life and nonlife too clean; rather, we are suggesting, against the prophylactics of “life,” that what’s most interesting about afterlives is the ghostly
demarcation or ambiguity of the distinction between the organic body
and the inorganic body, sense and nonsense, life and death.
Consider an everyday example of afterlives from The New York Times.
In “Harvey, Irma, Jose . . . and Noah,” David Brooks asks, “Is there anything we can learn from hurricanes, storms, and floods?”17 His answer is
worth pondering. Brooks writes: “Floods are invitations to recreate the
world. That only happens successfully when strong individuals are willing to yoke themselves to collective institutions.”18 Without exaggeration,
Brooks’s answer encapsulates the redemptive mood of the environmental
humanities and posthumanities today. Time and again, “we” are called on
to collectivize in the remaking of blue, green, and prismatic life-worlds.
The project of remaking the world in “our” image is, of course, so utterly
tied to our sense of place in the world, to our desperate clinging to an
ethics and habitus that sprouted in the Holocene but no longer keeps
pace with the accelerations of the Anthropocene, that even the end of our
world is (mis)read as an “invitation” to recreate the world for future generations. But here’s the rub: this version of the “end” is never as disastrous
as it should be, since it treats the disaster as something edifying; the sublime always creeps in.
Likewise, Renaissance Christian models of apocalypse, like those that
circulate in our era of extinctions, plagues, floods, and anthropogenic
catastrophes, remained resolutely anthropocentric, focused on human
salvation through the intervention of a loving god. Ark narratives, the
accompanying paratext of apocalypse, whether ancient or modern, are
similarly incapable of imagining the end of life without implying the persistence of life, world, and spirit. Even Andrew Marvell’s “yet green, yet
growing ark” (484), which imagines the speaker carried away in ecstatic
dissolve, removed from human history and shattered among the elements,
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cannot but end in the recapitulation of the genealogical (and heterosexual)
afterlife of the child (“The young Maria” [651]), whose future certainly
means no future for Marvell’s queer wood (“She straightness on the woods
bestows” [691, emphasis added]).19
By contrast, the Renaissance afterlives gathered in this collection,
though they may offer hope, do not sacrifice a disastrous reckoning for
the boon of a better tomorrow; instead, they entangle life’s creative diversity with a curious openness to life’s intractable negativity. As Benjamin
Bertram muses in his essay for this issue, an Erasmian ethics of communitas relies on an absence, a lack that is only resolved in an unrealizable
future when all humans, and all life, exist in “friendship” and mutual
respect. For Bertram, Erasmus’s dung beetle enjoys a posthumous life
because it uniquely embodies, indeed labors in the interests of, both life
and death. Bertram’s analysis of Erasmus disinters in the work of this
most humanist Renaissance thinker an impossible commitment to community, one that is only achieved in and through death.
Vin Nardizzi’s entry in this collection suggests yet more resonances
with the posthuman. Bringing disability studies and biopolitics to bear on
Renaissance exegetical practices, Nardizzi argues that, far from inventing
the human, Shakespeare retooled Oedipus’s “vulnerable footsteps” in the
image of a disabled, plant-like, and “posthumanist Gloucester.” By following after Oedipus’s injured steps, from Sophocles’s Oedipus Tyrannus to
King Lear to posthumanist and biopolitical discourses, Nardizzi not only
traces the afterlives of ancient texts but also demonstrates that Renaissance
writers were, perhaps despite themselves, already in the business of disseminating “human” form in wayward and precarious fashion, already
grafting the human body onto posthuman, vegetal, and disabled figures.
This manner of following after posthuman figures continues in Craig
Dionne’s essay, only this time taking us beyond ancient literary texts to the
recursive textuality of the Earth’s deep history. Dionne excavates the relationship between the deep evolutionary history of ecological materialism
and the local history of human action. The image of human action simultaneously fades in the time lapse of evolutionary history, while within that
scripted space a set of enmeshed agencies emerge: Shakespearean “bias”
questions the autonomy of human action, unpacks the virtual power of
nonhuman inscription, and ultimately frames human self-fashioning as
a novel way of improvising nonhuman scripts. Greenblatt, meet Darwin.
Our next essay turns to the precarity of our posthuman enmeshments.
Accounting for the premodern history of the gorilla, Holly Dugan asks
whether granting the gorilla a Renaissance would allow us “to create new
understandings . . . of premodern, posthuman interspecies interactions,
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especially ones that model a more expansive notion of what constitutes the
Renaissance and whose histories are included within it.” Doing so, Dugan
hints, might give us insights into the gorilla’s present precarious position
under threat of extinction.
For Julian Yates, pastoral fantasies in Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam
Trilogy are haunted by the specter of extinction as well, which is both a
game—Extinctathon—played by Oryx and Crake’s characters (who fail to
understand its relevance for Crake, engineer of the apocalypse) and the condition of writing in the postapocalyptic world inhabited by Crake’s friend,
Jimmy, whose journals necessarily address an inhuman future rather than
a human readership. Moving from the threat of extinction to the givenness of nonlife itself, Liza Blake’s essay finds in Margaret Cavendish’s
writings an anti-anthropomorphic vitalism that rejects the imposition of
human standards of liveliness or agency, anticipating recent theorists who
have questioned posthumanism’s privileging of these qualities. Finally,
Hillary Eklund’s essay turns to the disappearing future of wetlands to
uncover “a reading practice informed by the material and temporal
indistinction of wetlands themselves.” Eklund’s essay locates a structure
of feeling in the spatio-temporal indeterminacy of wetlands that is both
proleptic—anticipating “the possibility of wetlands’ disappearance”—
and “mingled”: “The temporalities of geologic ages, seasons of migration, historical annals, and evolutionary mutation mingle together in
an impure mixture that resembles the categorical indeterminacy of the
marsh itself.” Both affective and stratigraphic, the marsh in Eklund’s
essay mixes together nonlinear and nonhuman timescales in ways that are
not, strictly speaking, elegiac, since they point to futures hitherto unimagined, written in the peat and muck.
Together, these essays showcase the richness of early modern scholarship on the topic of the posthuman in fields ranging from ecocriticism,
disability studies, ethology, animal studies, genre theory, extinction
studies, biopolitics, and vital materialism. Turning now to the penultimate section of this introduction, we offer a reading of Shakespeare’s
Love’s Labour’s Lost centered on that most lively of posthuman figures,
the human face. Like Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet, Shakespeare’s
Love’s Labour’s Lost calls on “living art,” including the art of the face,
to tarry with the negative of “devouring time” in pursuit of eternal life or “fame” (1.1.1–14); only this art, the art of the face, proves
unstable—not only plastic (malleable, adaptive, and life-furthering)
but also explosive (plastique). We trace the shards of that destructive
plasticity to Jeff VanderMeer’s posthuman fiction, Annihilation, in
our conclusion.20
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Facing the Posthuman, Undoing the Face
Meditating on the intersection of art and the face as both are bound up in
posthuman extinction, Claire Colebrook embraces Deleuze and Guattari’s
insight that art is not, as she puts it, “the expression of humanity, in general, but the destruction of any such generality through the preservation
and temporality of the ‘nonorganic life of things.’”21 Without dismissing
the pull of the face entirely, Colebrook counters Levinas’s concept of the
face-to-face encounter that grounds his ethics as precisely about singularity, about the human race “mirroring itself” to the exclusion and destruction of all that is not human with accounts of what we might call the
faces of the Anthropocene—faces that fail to congeal into a single identity or elicit an affective response.22 The Levinasian face, as Deleuze and
Guattari point out, is always Western, European, white, and male: it is
not, they write, “a universal. It is not even that of the white man. It is
White Man himself.”23 Indeed, what a face is, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, is not a body part associated with the head but rather a “surface,”
a “map”—it is “the inhuman in human beings.”24 Colebrook asks with
regard to Levinas’s faciality, “Is face, human face in its radical distinction
and immateriality, really what one wants to save?”25 Or should art opt
instead for indistinction, for the annihilation of faciality altogether?
That question should not be unfamiliar to readers of Renaissance
literature, especially Shakespeare. Problems with faces are, after all, a
repeating motif in many plays—their relative readability, art’s role in
constructing them, their composite nature, their iterability or imitability. Previous scholarship has been rightly concerned with Shakespearean
faces as byproducts of acting skill or cosmetics, and as a register of categories like class, gender, or race. Certainly, Shakespeare’s faces put into
question the relative humanity and relative individuality of many of his
characters: just think about descriptions of Othello or Aaron, or the two
sets of twins in The Comedy of Errors. Yet Shakespeare also challenges the
association of the face with life itself, with vitality.
In Love’s Labour’s Lost, for instance, we find a case that uncannily
resembles what Katherine Behar calls “Botox ethics,” a deadening of the
face that assaults the tyranny of “vivophilia,” the privileging of the living over the dead.26 Writing from the perspective of Object-Oriented
Feminism, Behar questions the new materialism’s bias toward lively,
responsive dynamism in the objects, animals, and humans it assembles.
Like Liza Blake, whose essay on Cavendish for this collection resists the
bias toward life and liveliness that renders present theory “not so much
post-humanist as more expansively human,” Behar points out that when

Criticism 62.3_01_Raber and Swarbrick.indd

Page 319

15/09/20 2:37 pm

320

Steven Swarbrick and Karen Raber

posthumanist theory considers faces as objects, maps, or inhuman surfaces, they are still most often represented as alive, mobile, and so capable
of creating meaning through expression, which relies on living muscles,
tendons, and nerves all working actively together. In this fashion, materialism hangs on to a certain residual anthropocentrism, the preference
for what is, like us, alive and therefore endowed with organic agency.
For Colebrook, this inability to “say no to life” is at the root of the nostalgia for a (fictional) better version of humanity that prevents writers from
imagining our complete future erasure. Behar similarly argues that materialist theorists tend to resist self-implication in the networks of things
they observe. Behar argues that a “strategic necrophilia” might provide
a welcome interruption to this celebration of the mobile and so living
or vital features of the face. Botox, she argues, quite literally introduces
death into the lively visage of its user, but it also represents a “necrophilic
form of plasticity,” paralyzing the muscles that make the face move and
thereby preserving the face’s aesthetic organization.27 Unlike Colebrook
or Deleuze and Guattari before her, Behar does not reject singularity,
allowing that inward-directedness can function as a kind of productive
annihilation. A Botox-inhibited face loses muscle memory, loses mobility,
becomes deadened, and in this fashion interrupts engagement with other
faces, other humans, creating “a new form of inner-directedness”:
Botox ethics seeks not to articulate connections but to
inhibit them; to create not unbounded subjects but enclosed
objects; it recommends not outward-directed networking
and changeability but inward-directed unexpressivity and
singularity.28
Botox ethics “turns us into objects, shoots us up with our own plasticity,
and lets us—as objects—exist mutually, independently, and graciously.”29
Its deathliness is not an alternative so much as a means of complicating
the whole idea, the whole performance of life.
In its lovers’ obsessive focus on facial beauty, Love’s Labour’s Lost offers
an opportunity to think about the inhumanity of the face, its iterability,
and the ethical disabilities it incurs in those who dwell on it. The play
is also a rich test case for how a Beharian reading might work, enforcing in its generically confused and confusing conclusion a kind of Botox
ethics. The play hinges on acts of masking, philosophical ambitions that
are defeated by self-blind self-centeredness; above all, it keeps harping on
faces in proto-posthumanist ways that devitalize them. Berowne defends
Rosaline’s beauty from the King’s charge that she “is black as ebony”
(4.3.243) by finding her equal to such “wood” (4.3.245). Dumaine chides
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him for “holding vile stuff so dear,” while Longaville points to his shoe, saying, “Look, there’s thy love, my foot and her face see” (4.3.272, 273), which
the Arden glosses as a comparison between Rosaline and Longaville’s presumably ugly and black shoe. On the one hand, this exchange can be read
for the convergence of discourses involving xenophobia, the racializing of
barbarism (Berowne calls himself “a rude and savage man of Ind,” while
the King joins in mocking Berowne’s elevation of blackness by invoking
Ethiopes [4.3.218, 264]) and sexuality (since shoes can indicate baseness,
and therefore sexual debasement). But reading literally here makes some
sense as well, given the persistent interchangeability of faces and objects.
At the show of the Worthies, Holofernes is mercilessly teased: “Thou hast
no face,” Berowne tells him, which is why he “will not be put out of countenance” (5.2.604, 603). “What is this,” Holofernes responds, pointing
to his face (5.2.605): the group responds by supplying options—a cittern
(guitar) head, the head of a bodkin (hairpin), a death’s face in a ring, the
pommel of Caesar’s sword, a face carved on a flask, a profile embossed on
a brooch. “We have put thee in countenance,” says Berowne; “we have
given thee faces” (5.2.619).
In this cascade of objects that can stand in for faces, or have faces
on them, or in some way present a face to the world, the whole idea of
what a face is, what it means to have one, is thoroughly disfigured, leaving Holofernes not merely disconcerted (“put out of countenance”) but
simultaneously denied a face altogether and granted too many of them.
In Levinasian terms, this might mean that the company of nobles has
become inhospitable to Holofernes, is denying his humanity, refusing to
be taken hostage by his face, as it were. They are collectively the Judith
who engineers his facial “death.” But such a humane humanist reading is
undercut by the sheer fact that everything under the sun in this play has a
face: literally, the sun, the heavens, the earth, women, men, the moon, as
well as coins, rings, flasks—the play uses the word “face” more than any
other Shakespeare work. This leaves no place for Holofernes to establish
a distinction, an exception for his human face. He drowns in the flood of
gifts from his noble audience. His face, along with Rosaline’s black shoelike visage, is merely an object or assemblage, plastic but neither lively nor
authentic.30
Arts of Unliving
At its root, the problem of faciality is one of reading—how to make sense
of the other and the self, how to distinguish the two, or even discover if
there can be such things as “self” or “other.” Shakespeare throws the act of
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reading into question, weirding it, hollowing it out and twisting it toward
the uncanny in Love’s Labour’s Lost.
Julian Yates, in his essay for this collection, observes that “speculative
fiction serves as a discursive trading ground with texts past.” In Atwood’s
case, Yates details the changes she rings on pastoral form, on tales of lone
survivors, on the novel itself. The Robinson Crusoe journaling of her
protagonist has, as far as Jimmy believes, no future readership. By the
trilogy’s end, the Craker who ultimately emerges as scriptor writes the
postapocalypse for and about a species that is, Yates notes, both “more and
less than human.” Perhaps even more than pastoral, a genre like romance
absorbs and transmutes posthumanist ideas while charting its journeys on
land, sea, and beyond the boundaries of the planet. About Shakespeare’s
romances Steve Mentz has argued that the form evolves to describe a new
set of environmental conditions: the rediscovery of late classical Greek
romances in the Renaissance spurred a flourishing of this most “scandalous” but “durable literary kind.”31 Shakespeare’s ecologically attuned tales
of catastrophes and recovery reflect the genre’s function as a kind of ecological machine, recycling forms from both comedy and tragedy into new
and useful paradigms. The plays are especially prescient in their decentering of the human hero, who is made subject to natural systems, often
through maritime disasters like shipwrecks. Instead of human authority,
individuality, and dominance, romance privileges interconnection and
persistence.32 What we now call science fiction or speculative fiction was
once described as scientific romance, and its key feature, especially in the
work of a figure like H. G. Wells, was likewise the decentering of a human
hero who was subjected to long-term natural processes like evolution.33
The recent posthumanist fiction of Jeff VanderMeer (called by one
reviewer the “weird Thoreau”34), as does Atwood’s MaddAddam novels,
seizes on this aspect of romance; Annihilation also ends up eerily, perhaps
instinctively haunted by Shakespeare’s most famous romance play, The
Tempest, a play that Scott Maisano has argued is a precursor to scientific
romance.35 This is not to say that VanderMeer’s Annihilation, the first volume of his Southern Reach Trilogy, consciously engages with Shakespeare
but rather that it teems with uncanny traces and shadowy remains—the
afterlives—of Shakespeare’s play.
Annihilation’s Area X is an amorphously expanding zone, an island
walled off by an alien force, full of noises, hums, and strange sounds; it
is a spongy, mossy, hallucinatory sphere that is ambiguously located.36 A
series of expeditions have been sent into the zone, all of which have either
murderously self-destructed or returned transformed beyond recognition. The novel is narrated by the biologist of the most recent party, who
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studies the zone’s transmutation of all that lies within its boundaries into
“something rich and strange.” In Area X, human life is merely more vital
matter to be colonized as part of what might be the end of humanity—
but might also remedy the shipwreck of a hollow, corporatized, necrotic
world beyond. It is a “hyperobject,” to use Timothy Morton’s term, a phenomenon beyond apprehension yet viscerally present.37 There, expedition
members known only by their disciplinary fields (biologist, psychologist,
surveyor, anthropologist, linguist) encounter weird life forms they cannot
recognize in a terrain that they cannot map, even with, or perhaps especially with the tools of traditional knowledge-gathering that they possess.
They are perplexed, entangled, and finally colonized, deterritorialized in
the Deleuzian sense, but also physically, materially infected with a kind
of fungal growth produced within the boundaries of the “island.”38 In a
deserted village the biologist finds decaying houses filled with “peculiar
eruptions of moss or lichen” whose posture and location suggests they
are the remnants of human beings.39 She cuts a sample of moss from the
“forehead” of one of these, projecting onto the mass the underlying structures of a face where none remains. Her sample goes nowhere, reveals
nothing about what these eruptions are. Stumbling over an object “rising
out of the earth . . . a kind of tan mask made of skin, half-transparent,
resembling in its way the discarded shell of a horseshoe crab,” the biologist muses, “I felt as if I should recognize these features—that it was very
important—but with them disembodied in this way, I could not.”40 The
materials that make up human bodies and human faces are absorbed—
and recycled. Outside the village, she glimpses a dolphin in a canal: it
looks back at her with an eye that strikes her as “painfully human.”41 Area
X fashions its own “fish-man,” its own Caliban, by distributing human
and animal parts indiscriminately across new life forms.
Instead of a drowned book or a Crusoe chronicle that no humans will
read, Annihilation gives us textual decay in the form of a pile of journals from past groups that molder in the lighthouse at the center of the
sphere of anomaly. Language, books, and photographs like body parts
fail to perform their appropriate tasks, serving rather as compost for the
zone’s fungal life. The biologist struggles to follow the phrases written on
a spiral subterranean tower, generated out of the living substance of the
walls themselves. Like the biologist, the reader knows little that is certain, experiencing a deconstruction of the usual categories of reading or
knowledge: without its linguist, who never makes it past Area X’s boundary, the biologist must unravel alone the words written on the walls of an
inverted spiral tower, words generated out of fungal growths that ultimately form a long gnomically self-referential “text.” The reader likewise
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joins the journey, seeking meaning, driving toward the novel’s conclusion
in hopes of revelation. We operate from the assumption that our generic
expectations provide us a kind of map, with recognizable features and a
resolution, a departure from the island, at the story’s end. But what is a
map, the biologist wonders, “but a way of emphasizing some things and
making other things invisible?”42 Rather than leaving Area X, she heads
deeper in to its confinement, leaving her fungal doppelganger, Ghost
Bird, to exit the “island” and return—or invade—the Southern Reach. It
is Ghost Bird who will return eventually at the conclusion of the trilogy’s
third novel Acceptance, an inhuman human with a willing, still-human
fellow traveler, Grace, to discover that “the hegemony of what was real
had been . . . broken forever.”43
Nor does Shakespeare always choose to mend this broken hegemony.
The Tempest’s Prospero promises “I’ll deliver all” but then faces the audience to request they lift the spell that keeps him, now humble and powerless, enslaved on this theatrical fantasy island rather than restored to his
“Naples.” Where is the real here, where the fiction? The conclusion of
Love’s Labour’s Lost works in related fashion, offering no direct corrective
to Holofernes’s humiliation by reestablishing his humanity. Holofernes is,
after all, not the real problem in the play. It’s his noble tormenters who
most need a dose of Botox ethics. At the news that the princess’s father has
died, merriment turns to grief in the unexpected about-face of the play’s
final scene, and she appoints to the men one year of study, this time in an
“insociable” environment where they may more carefully evaluate their
attachment to the women they wish to marry (5.2.795). With no one to
witness their actions and no humanist subjects to study, the men accept
a banishment that may educate them in the limits of their own situated
knowledge of the world. The men are appointed to withdraw into a kind of
strategically imposed misanthropy, becoming temporary hermits to learn
the limitations of their humanist leanings, ghostly birds of prey denied the
targets of their desire. At a minimum, their new “academy” will correct
their erroneous assumption that their countenances are what count. If the
end of comedy is the compulsory creation of new life and the affirmation
of social networks, then Shakespeare’s play resists that outcome, enforcing instead in its tragicomic turn a paralysis, as the men enter a kind of
suspended animation. In this fashion, they are implicated in the system of
object-substitutions they playfully mobilized against Holofernes—made
frozen objects waiting to learn to “exist mutually, independently, and graciously” alongside those from whom they believed themselves distinct. Is
there a future here? Perhaps, or perhaps they never learn and are consigned to extinction. This play chooses not to imagine that future.
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We confront a similar crisis of reading in the face of extinction. The
Holocene conferred wholeness, indivisibility (holo = whole), and established a recognizable, supposedly reliable narrative; the Anthropocene
disfigures and defaces that narrative and human beings’ place in it, leaving us out of countenance. Anthropocene humans haunt themselves, with
faces at once animal, vegetable, and mineral. Shakespeare’s discombobulated Holofernes belongs to a genealogy of that phenomenon, a precursor
to the derailments that are required of stories that can cope with anthropogenic crisis. The essays we have collected here offer a range of “weird
fictions,” new models for reading askew, and new Renaissance textual
revenants that might productively afflict our troubled present.
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Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1999); and Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2010).
4. See Stacy Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe
Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2007); Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Donna J. Haraway, When Species Meet
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008); and Bruno Latour, “An Attempt at a
‘Compositionist Manifesto,’” New Literary History 41 (2010): 471–490.
5. See Claire Colebrook, Death of the Posthuman: Essays on Extinction, vol. 1 (Ann Arbor,
MI: Open Humanities Press, 2014); Michel Serres, The Parasite, trans. Lawrence R.
Schehr (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); and Eugene Thacker, After
Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
6. See Dana Luciano and Mel Y. Chen, “Introduction: Has the Queer Ever Been Human?”
GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 21, no. 2 & 3 (June 2015): iv–207.
7. For a related account of the posthuman as a problem in the Deleuzo-Guattarian sense,
see Claire Colebrook and Jami Weinstein, “Preface: Postscript on the Posthuman,”
in Posthumous Life: Theorizing Beyond the Posthuman, ed. Claire Colebrook and Jami
Weinstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), ix–xxix.
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